Trust Law 104 Estate Law & The Feudal System (Mortgage Fraud)

This booklet will be put into the most colloquial way possible for easy comprehension. This booklet will be written etymologically-sound to the best of my ability and the words used will be true to their definitive definition.

1. A Mortgage, as defined in Henry Campbell Black’s Law dictionary is merely a lien and does not create title to an estate. Easily put, if you get a mortgage, this does not mean you own the home. The same stands true to the deed of trust, this also does not mean you own the estate. The word deed simply means action and a trust is an abstract noun, being an idea, is placed on paper, as the mortgage and promissory note, which is to remain private, is supposed to be reflected in the “Deed of Trust” to ensure private information is not revealed to the public. Of course, just because things should be a certain way, doesn’t mean people will do it the correct way. These reigns true in the fact that you and others, have the right to contract. So, if you wish to do it “incorrectly” or pursuant to feudal law, you are well within your right. Just as if you were contracting pursuant to common-law or constitutional law you would be well within your right: i.e. slavery is a choice. As stated in the Holy Books – “To you your way and to me mine.”

Christian Black Codes of 1724 - Article 22: We declare that slaves have no right to any kind of property but that all that they acquire either by their own industry, or by the ability of others, or by any other means or title whatever shall be the full property of their masters; and the children of said slaves, their fathers, mothers, their kindred or other relation either free or slave shall have no pretensions or claim thereto, either through testamentary nor positions or donations inter vivace; which dispositions and donations we declare null and void, and also whatever promise they may have interred into by persons incapable of disposing of anything and or participating to any contract.

MORTGAGE. An estate created by a conveyance absolute in its form, but intended to secure the performance of some act, such as the payment of money, and the like, by the grantor or some other person, and to become void if the act is performed agreeably to the terms prescribed at the time of making such conveyance. 1 Washb.Real Prop. *475. A conditional conveyance of land. Mitchell v. Burnham, 44 Me. 299. A transfer of property passing conditionally as security for debt. Potter v. Vernon, 129 Okl. 251, 264 P. 611, 613. A debt by specialty, secured by a pledge of lands, of which the legal ownership is vested in the creditor, but of which, in equity, the debtor and those claiming under him remain the actual owners, until debarred by judicial sentence or their own laches, Coote, Mortg. 1. The foregoing definitions are applicable to the common-law conception of a mortgage. But in many states in modern times, it is regarded as a mere lien, and not as creating a title or estate. Zeigler v. Sawyer, Tex.Civ.App., 16 S.W.2d 894, 896. It is a pledge or security of particular property for the payment of a debt or the performance of some other obligation, whatever form the transaction may take, but is not now regarded as a conveyance in effect, though it may be cast in the form of a conveyance. Muth v. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237, 72 P. 621, 98 Am.St.Rep. 553; Johnson v. Robinson, 68 Tex. 399, 4 S.W. 625; Killebrew v. Hines, 104 N.C. 182, 10 S.E. 159, 17 Am.St.Rep. 672; Stockel v. Elich, 297 P. 595, 597, 112 Cal.App. 588; In re Morgan, D.C.N.J., 39 F.2d 489, 490. Chattel mortgage. A mortgage of goods, chattels, or personal property

2. A promissory note is exactly what it sounds like. It’s a promise, written down, thus, in the form of a note, like when you pass notes in high-school. This is where the 4-corner rule comes into play. As opposed to filing a claim in court based on a verbal promise, which, without video or audio evidence would be difficulty to prove. It becomes easier for everyone to just write things down. This written expression of thought is also where we get the phrase “expressed trust.” It is just that simple.

3. 4 Corner Rule, simply means, any civil litigation based on contracts will not be based on what litigants say about the contractual agreement, as far as terms and conditions. But solely and strictly based on the written agreement (law) of the contract itself, this is based in equity. Of course, with other pre-imposed conditions. Such as full-disclosure, honor, mental status, equal valuable exchange and consent, et alia.

4. The word mortgage, etymologically, means dead pledge.

5. The mortgage is merely a lien on the house. Which the mortgage contract / promissory note, states that, if the amount allegedly loaned is not paid in full, based on a default, then the house is taken as collateral. Thus, the home is the collateral interest in the mortgage contract.

6. All mortgages are liner-contracts.

7. The alleged loaning agency (creditor) never loaned you anything of actual value, which makes the entire deed (action) void ab initio. But, since credit is an abstract noun (not physical), and you agreed that they are the creditor and not the lender, they contractually don’t have to give you anything. Since you do not challenge this via an adverse claim and agree via your ignorant (tacit) compliance (acquiescence) and trust that these people are going to be honest with you simply because they have a suit and a smile on their face. You become their Chattel by consent, agreement, and your own ignorant free-will.

Ignorant – Late 14th century., “lacking wisdom or knowledge; unaware.” From Old French (14th Century) ignorant, from Latin ignorantem (nominative /pertaining to - ignorans) “not knowing,” “not to know, to be unacquainted, mistake, misunderstood; take no notice of, pay no attention to.”

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[1] All rights reserved. The applicable law governing all contracts, books, and declarations may be, pursuant to Article PART 3. of the Uniform Commercial Codes, the Uniform Commercial Codes to include any and all applicable State, Federal and International Laws to include Treaties. § 1-202. Notice; Knowledge. § 1-206. Presumptions. § 1-305. Remedies to be Liberally Administered. § 1-307. Prima Facie Evidence by Third-Party Documents. § 7-104. Negotiable and Nonnegotiable Document of Title.
[2] COPYRIGHT. The right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. An intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them. In re Rider, 16 R.I. 271, 15 A. 72; Mott Iron Works v. Clow, C.C.A.Ill., 82 F. 316, 27 C.C.A. 250; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 536, 7 Am.Rep. 480; Stuff v. La Budde Feed & Grain Co., D.C.Wis., 42 F.Supp. 493, 497; Schill v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 179 Md. 83, 17 A.2d 175.
[3] COMMON-LAW LIEN. One known to or granted by the common law, as distinguished from statutory, equitable, and maritime liens; also one arising by implication of law, as distinguished from one created by the agreement of the parties. The Menominie, D.C.Minn., 36 F. 197; Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Trustee, 117 Ky. 478, 78 S.W. 413, 64 L.R.A. 219. It is a right extended to a person to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another, until the demand or charge of the person in possession is paid or satisfied. Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., C.C.A.Colo., 101 F.2d 765, 769; Goldwater v. Mendelson, 8 N.Y.S. 627, 629, 170 Misc. 422.
[4] COMMON-LAW REMEDY. This phrase, within the meaning of U. S. Judicial Code 1911, § 256 (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1100, see Historical and Revision Notes under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333), was not limited to remedies in the common-law courts, but embraced all methods of enforcing rights and redressing injuries known to the common or statutory law. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372, 375, L.R.A. 1916A, 436. See, also, Northern Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission of California, 174 Cal. 346, 163 P. 199, 202.
[5] COMMON-LAW TRADE-MARK. One appropriated under common-law rules, regardless of statutes. Stratton & Terstegge Co. v. Stiglitz Furnace Co., 258 Ky. 678, 81 S.W.2d 1, 3.
[6] COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT. An intangible, incorporeal right in an author of literary or artistic productions to reproduce and sell them exclusively and arises at the moment of their creation as distinguished from federal or statutory copyrights which exist for the most part only in published works. Common law copyright is perpetual while statutory copyright is for term of years. Equitable relief is available for violation of common law copyright. Edgar H. Wood Associates Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886.
[7] 17 U.S. Code § 401. Notice of copyright: Visually perceptible copies. 17 U.S. Code CHAPTER 5— COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND REMEDIES.

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Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/319/105/

The mere fact that the religious literature is "sold", rather than "donated" does not transform the activities of the colporteur into a commercial enterprise.

A State may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.

A community may not suppress, or the State tax, the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying, or distasteful.

But the mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itinerant preachers, rather than "donated," does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the collection plate in church would make the church service a commercial project. The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books. The right to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge. It is plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going concern. But an itinerant evangelist, however misguided or intolerant he may be, does not become a mere book agent by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his expenses or to sustain him. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way. As we have said, the problem of drawing the line between a purely commercial activity and a religious one will, at times, be difficult. On this record, it plainly cannot be said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial, rather than a religious, venture. It is a distortion of the facts of record to describe their activities as the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. And the Pennsylvania court did not rest the judgments of conviction on that basis, though it did find that petitioners "sold" the literature. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in State v. Mead, 230 Iowa 1217, 300 N.W. 523, 524, described the selling activities of members of this same sect as "merely incidental and collateral" to their "main object, which was to preach and publicize the doctrines of their order." And see State v. Meredith, 197 S.C. 351, 15 S.E.2d 678; People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 385-386, 46 N.E.2d 329. That accurately summarizes the present record.

Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part of the vital power of the press which has survived from the Reformation.