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Res Judicata

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Res Judicata is a principle or maxim in law that deals with cases already adjudicated and said cases, either quotes or the case itself is then used for substantiating the accuser or defendants proof of claim; expression of pre-existing rights, constitutional enforcement, the adherence to due process, or commanding the courts to act on a matter, make a decision or issue a judgment or decree in your favor, et alia.

Res judicata (RJ) or res iudicata, also known as claim preclusion, is the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and refers to either of two concepts: in both civil law and common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal; and the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of a case on same issues between the same parties. In this latter usage, the term is synonymous with "issue preclusion". In the case of res judicata, the matter cannot be raised again, either in the same court or in a different court. A court will use res judicata to deny reconsideration of a matter.


Excerpt from Cornell University, a private and statutory Ivy League research university in Ithaca, New York. Founded in 1865. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_judicata

Overview

Generally, res judicata is the principle that a cause of action may not be relitigated once it has been judged on the merits. "Finality" is the term which refers to when a court renders a final judgment on the merits.

Res judicata is also frequently referred to as "claim preclusion," and the two are used interchangeably throughout this article. 

Breaking Down the Concept

Claim preclusion can be best understood by breaking it down into two sub-categories:

Bar - a losing plaintiff cannot re-sue a winning defendant on the same cause of action


example: Plaintiff P sues Defendant D on Cause of Action C, but P loses. P may not try for better luck by initiating a new lawsuit against D on C.


Merger - a winning plaintiff cannot re-sue a losing defendant on the same cause of action


example: Plaintiff P successfully sues Defendant D on Cause of Action C. P may not again sue D on C to try to recover more damages.

Damages

As illustrated in the merger example, a claim can have finality, even when the judge does not award damages. Thus even if a winning party believes he deserves more in damages than he received (or if he received no damages, he believes he deserves some damages), he is not able to sue on the same cause of action. 

Policies of Preclusion 

There is a litany of cases dealing with res judicata. Courts, often uphold the doctrine, and typically justify res judicata based on several polices:


promoting efficiency


promoting fairness


avoiding inconsistent adjudication

Does Claim Preclusion Apply for Adjudication Not "On The Merits?" 

"On the merits" refers to a judgment, decision, or ruling that a court will make based on the law, after hearing all of the relevant facts and evidence presented in court. Claim preclusion historically only referred to cases decided on the merits. However, the modern view taken by most jurisdictions is that a dismissal based on a failure to state a claim is also claim preclusive. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deals with a dismissal based on a failure to state a claim. 

According, however, to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the following are not claim preclusive and are not considered an adjudication "on the merits":


a lack of jurisdiction


improper venue


failure to join a party when required to do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 (aka "Mandatory Joinder")


voluntary dismissals


if the dismissal order does not state otherwise (i.e. a decision made "without prejudice" would not be claim preclusive")

Many jurisdictions also find that res judicata applies to a "dismissal for a failure to prosecute." This phrase refers to an involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff's claims when the plaintiff fails to comply with the court's orders in some ways. These dismissals, however, are highly reviewable by appellate courts to ensure that the trial court was not abusing its discretion. 

Counterclaims

Generally, claim preclusion applies to counterclaims. Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs counterclaims. 

The rules regarding unasserted counterclaims, however, have some nuance. While an unasserted permissive counterclaim is not precluded, an unasserted compulsory counterclaim, is precluded. There are 2 exceptions to this rule:


The defendant's compulsory counterclaim may not be precluded if he was not aware that he could bring the compulsory counterclaim (Dindo v. Whitney 1971)


If the defendant wins an affirmative defense, then the defendant can counterclaim on the same facts 

Some jurisdictions also follow the "Common Law Compulsory Counterclaim Rule." This rule states that if "Party A" fails to assert an available counterclaim during "Trial A," then "Party A" is precluded from suing in "Trial B" if granting relief of that action would nullify the judgment from "Trial A."

Alternative Techniques to Preclude Another Party’s Actions 

In addition to bar and merger, there are two other techniques that courts look to which have the same effect on a cause of action as claim preclusion:


Estoppel


"Party A" cannot litigate a position when that position is inconsistent with "Party A's" earlier conduct which "Party B" has detrimentally relied upon


Judicial estoppel


"Party A" cannot unfairly take factual positions in litigation that are inconsistent with previous positions that Party A had taken in prior judicial proceedings

Claim Preclusion and Adverse Parties 

In judicial proceedings, claim preclusion only applies to adverse parties, it does not apply to co-parties (ex: a party that has been joined via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20). Contrast this rule with collateral estoppel (also known as "issue preclusion"), which applies to both co-parties and adverse parties. 

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All rights reserved and retained. No part of any book or publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, mechanical or otherwise without the prior written permission of Jamhal Talib Abdullah Bey, his heirs, descendants or his estate.

[1] All rights reserved. The applicable law governing all contracts, books, and declarations may be, pursuant to Article PART 3. of the Uniform Commercial Codes, the Uniform Commercial Codes to include any and all applicable State, Federal and International Laws to include Treaties. § 1-202. Notice; Knowledge. § 1-206. Presumptions. § 1-305. Remedies to be Liberally Administered. § 1-307. Prima Facie Evidence by Third-Party Documents. § 7-104. Negotiable and Nonnegotiable Document of Title.
[2] COPYRIGHT. The right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. An intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them. In re Rider, 16 R.I. 271, 15 A. 72; Mott Iron Works v. Clow, C.C.A.Ill., 82 F. 316, 27 C.C.A. 250; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 536, 7 Am.Rep. 480; Stuff v. La Budde Feed & Grain Co., D.C.Wis., 42 F.Supp. 493, 497; Schill v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 179 Md. 83, 17 A.2d 175.
[3] COMMON-LAW LIEN. One known to or granted by the common law, as distinguished from statutory, equitable, and maritime liens; also one arising by implication of law, as distinguished from one created by the agreement of the parties. The Menominie, D.C.Minn., 36 F. 197; Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Trustee, 117 Ky. 478, 78 S.W. 413, 64 L.R.A. 219. It is a right extended to a person to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another, until the demand or charge of the person in possession is paid or satisfied. Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., C.C.A.Colo., 101 F.2d 765, 769; Goldwater v. Mendelson, 8 N.Y.S. 627, 629, 170 Misc. 422.
[4] COMMON-LAW REMEDY. This phrase, within the meaning of U. S. Judicial Code 1911, § 256 (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1100, see Historical and Revision Notes under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333), was not limited to remedies in the common-law courts, but embraced all methods of enforcing rights and redressing injuries known to the common or statutory law. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372, 375, L.R.A. 1916A, 436. See, also, Northern Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission of California, 174 Cal. 346, 163 P. 199, 202.
[5] COMMON-LAW TRADE-MARK. One appropriated under common-law rules, regardless of statutes. Stratton & Terstegge Co. v. Stiglitz Furnace Co., 258 Ky. 678, 81 S.W.2d 1, 3.
[6] COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT. An intangible, incorporeal right in an author of literary or artistic productions to reproduce and sell them exclusively and arises at the moment of their creation as distinguished from federal or statutory copyrights which exist for the most part only in published works. Common law copyright is perpetual while statutory copyright is for term of years. Equitable relief is available for violation of common law copyright. Edgar H. Wood Associates Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886.
[7] 17 U.S. Code § 401. Notice of copyright: Visually perceptible copies. 17 U.S. Code CHAPTER 5— COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND REMEDIES.

For educational purposes only. The reader, possessor or owner of any book, information, documents et cetera, agrees that they will not furnish or cause to be furnished, any information obtained from RISE OF THE MOORS or Jamhal Talib Abdullah Bey, directly or indirectly, to any known or unknown law enforcement or police officers. And that all information acquired is in admissible in any court of the United States; and that RISE OF THE MOORS, its founder, members, affiliates, associates and officials are exempt nor to be held liable in suits related to the information from the organization, regardless of its content. No information is produced with the intent to cause or incite any action by the reader or owner of any products or items obtained from RISE OF THE MOORS, its founder, members, affiliates, associates and officials. The reader understands and comprehends that this and all other pieces of information or statements made by RISE OF THE MOORS, its founder, members, affiliates, associates and officials, is in no way intended to cause, provoke or promote the reader or listener to do, say or act in any manner.

Organizations, such as charities, seeking Federal tax exemption are required to file an application with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  Other organizations, such as social welfare organizations, may file an application but are not required to do so.  - https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.html#background

The IRS defines a social welfare organization as: [A]n organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the community.  - https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici03.pdf

RISE OF THE MOORS is a civic organization and is therefore tax-exempt.  In Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 1963), the court, in defining a civic organization, summed up the matter by stating that "the organization must be a community movement designed to accomplish community ends."

While some activities promote social welfare only if the community as a whole is the recipient of services, a membership organization is not automatically precluded from exempt status. In the exceptional case, an organization whose services are made available solely to its members may qualify. In such cases, it must be clearly established that making the service available to the membership benefits the community as a whole. Social welfare organization may engage in some political activities, so long as that is not its primary activity. 

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/319/105/

The mere fact that the religious literature is "sold", rather than "donated" does not transform the activities of the colporteur into a commercial enterprise.

A State may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.

A community may not suppress, or the State tax, the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying, or distasteful.

But the mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itinerant preachers, rather than "donated," does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the collection plate in church would make the church service a commercial project. The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books. The right to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge. It is plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going concern. But an itinerant evangelist, however misguided or intolerant he may be, does not become a mere book agent by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his expenses or to sustain him. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way. As we have said, the problem of drawing the line between a purely commercial activity and a religious one will, at times, be difficult. On this record, it plainly cannot be said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial, rather than a religious, venture. It is a distortion of the facts of record to describe their activities as the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. And the Pennsylvania court did not rest the judgments of conviction on that basis, though it did find that petitioners "sold" the literature. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in State v. Mead, 230 Iowa 1217, 300 N.W. 523, 524, described the selling activities of members of this same sect as "merely incidental and collateral" to their "main object, which was to preach and publicize the doctrines of their order." And see State v. Meredith, 197 S.C. 351, 15 S.E.2d 678; People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 385-386, 46 N.E.2d 329. That accurately summarizes the present record.

Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part of the vital power of the press which has survived from the Reformation.
  • Home
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