Recover your home after a foreclosure

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LEARN ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS TO SUE AND WIN YOUR PROPERTY BACK


In the event you’ve already lost your home due to a foreclosure, you may have grounds to sue the bank for 1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 2) Fraud; 3) Estate Embezzlement et alia.

All promissory notes and mortgages are null and void for fraud and breach of trust on the part of the mortgagee, which is the lender in a mortgage, typically a bank. Who never fulfilled their portion of the agreement and never transferred any money.

The nature of a promissory note is that of a certain sum of money allegedly being borrowed. The nature of the mortgage is a security on that loan of money. It secures the bank in the event the loan is not fully paid. The house is taken as collateral for the value of the loan.

But, in order for the house to be pledged as security for the loan, the money has to first have been lent. As the mortgage is predicated on the promissory note and the note relies on the parties fulfilling their fiduciary obligations.

The bank never sends any transaction, check, money order, deposit, or cash to the borrower, thereby creating no debt. But the individual is still listed as a borrower, although they never have been given any money, and are required to make payments to the bank for money they never received.

This is not only fraud, as the bank never intends to give any money. The bank is in breach of their fiduciary duty as the bank promises to lend the money and never does. The fraud takes place by the banks promise to lend and the now deceived borrower is now sending real payments to the bank for a loan the never received.


“one is liable for fraudulent deceit if he‘ deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk . . . .’ Section 1710 of the Civil Code defines deceit for the purposes of Civil Code section 1709 as, inter alia, ‘[a] promise, made without any intention of performing it.’ ‘ “The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or 1177 nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.”[Citations.]’ Each element must be alleged with particularity.” (Beckwith v. Dahl(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1059-1060 [141 Cal.Rptr.3d 142], internal citations omitted.)


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All rights reserved and retained. No part of any book or publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, mechanical or otherwise without the prior written permission of Jamhal Talib Abdullah Bey, his heirs, descendants or his estate.

[1] All rights reserved. The applicable law governing all contracts, books, and declarations may be, pursuant to Article PART 3. of the Uniform Commercial Codes, the Uniform Commercial Codes to include any and all applicable State, Federal and International Laws to include Treaties. § 1-202. Notice; Knowledge. § 1-206. Presumptions. § 1-305. Remedies to be Liberally Administered. § 1-307. Prima Facie Evidence by Third-Party Documents. § 7-104. Negotiable and Nonnegotiable Document of Title.
[2] COPYRIGHT. The right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. An intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them. In re Rider, 16 R.I. 271, 15 A. 72; Mott Iron Works v. Clow, C.C.A.Ill., 82 F. 316, 27 C.C.A. 250; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 536, 7 Am.Rep. 480; Stuff v. La Budde Feed & Grain Co., D.C.Wis., 42 F.Supp. 493, 497; Schill v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 179 Md. 83, 17 A.2d 175.
[3] COMMON-LAW LIEN. One known to or granted by the common law, as distinguished from statutory, equitable, and maritime liens; also one arising by implication of law, as distinguished from one created by the agreement of the parties. The Menominie, D.C.Minn., 36 F. 197; Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Trustee, 117 Ky. 478, 78 S.W. 413, 64 L.R.A. 219. It is a right extended to a person to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another, until the demand or charge of the person in possession is paid or satisfied. Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., C.C.A.Colo., 101 F.2d 765, 769; Goldwater v. Mendelson, 8 N.Y.S. 627, 629, 170 Misc. 422.
[4] COMMON-LAW REMEDY. This phrase, within the meaning of U. S. Judicial Code 1911, § 256 (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1100, see Historical and Revision Notes under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333), was not limited to remedies in the common-law courts, but embraced all methods of enforcing rights and redressing injuries known to the common or statutory law. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372, 375, L.R.A. 1916A, 436. See, also, Northern Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission of California, 174 Cal. 346, 163 P. 199, 202.
[5] COMMON-LAW TRADE-MARK. One appropriated under common-law rules, regardless of statutes. Stratton & Terstegge Co. v. Stiglitz Furnace Co., 258 Ky. 678, 81 S.W.2d 1, 3.
[6] COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT. An intangible, incorporeal right in an author of literary or artistic productions to reproduce and sell them exclusively and arises at the moment of their creation as distinguished from federal or statutory copyrights which exist for the most part only in published works. Common law copyright is perpetual while statutory copyright is for term of years. Equitable relief is available for violation of common law copyright. Edgar H. Wood Associates Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886.
[7] 17 U.S. Code § 401. Notice of copyright: Visually perceptible copies. 17 U.S. Code CHAPTER 5— COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND REMEDIES.

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Organizations, such as charities, seeking Federal tax exemption are required to file an application with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  Other organizations, such as social welfare organizations, may file an application but are not required to do so.  - https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.html#background

The IRS defines a social welfare organization as: [A]n organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the community.  - https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici03.pdf

RISE OF THE MOORS is a civic organization and is therefore tax-exempt.  In Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 1963), the court, in defining a civic organization, summed up the matter by stating that "the organization must be a community movement designed to accomplish community ends."

While some activities promote social welfare only if the community as a whole is the recipient of services, a membership organization is not automatically precluded from exempt status. In the exceptional case, an organization whose services are made available solely to its members may qualify. In such cases, it must be clearly established that making the service available to the membership benefits the community as a whole. Social welfare organization may engage in some political activities, so long as that is not its primary activity. 

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/319/105/

The mere fact that the religious literature is "sold", rather than "donated" does not transform the activities of the colporteur into a commercial enterprise.

A State may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.

A community may not suppress, or the State tax, the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying, or distasteful.

But the mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itinerant preachers, rather than "donated," does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the collection plate in church would make the church service a commercial project. The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books. The right to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge. It is plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going concern. But an itinerant evangelist, however misguided or intolerant he may be, does not become a mere book agent by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his expenses or to sustain him. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way. As we have said, the problem of drawing the line between a purely commercial activity and a religious one will, at times, be difficult. On this record, it plainly cannot be said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial, rather than a religious, venture. It is a distortion of the facts of record to describe their activities as the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. And the Pennsylvania court did not rest the judgments of conviction on that basis, though it did find that petitioners "sold" the literature. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in State v. Mead, 230 Iowa 1217, 300 N.W. 523, 524, described the selling activities of members of this same sect as "merely incidental and collateral" to their "main object, which was to preach and publicize the doctrines of their order." And see State v. Meredith, 197 S.C. 351, 15 S.E.2d 678; People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 385-386, 46 N.E.2d 329. That accurately summarizes the present record.

Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part of the vital power of the press which has survived from the Reformation.