Commonwealth v Jones-Pannell 472 Mass 429: Identifying the moment of seizure is a crucial question for purposes of deciding to suppress.
Deyo v Montgomery County Sheriffs Office U.S. Dist Lexis 215207: (Community care-taking divorced from the detection, investigation or acquisition of evidence relating to violations of a criminal statute.)
Commonwealth v Lindsy 72 Mass App Ct 485, 492, 893 N.E. 2d 52: [The emergency exception to Miranda], This exception applies to a narrow class of circumstances; "[tine injury sought to be avoided must be immediate and serious, and the mere existence of a potentially harmful circumstance is not sufficient." Commonwealth v. Kirschner, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 841-842 (2006).
Commonwealth v Sondrini 48 Mass App Ct 704, 707, 724 N.E. 2d 748: (In which a warrantless police intrusion may have been justified because of the community care-taking function. But lost justification once the police transformed it into the investigation of criminal activity.)
State v DeArman 54 Wash 621, 625 744 P 2d 1247: Once it became clear to officer that the motorists car was not disabled and did not need assistance, officer had no reason to proceed with stop.
State v Markgraf 59 Wash App 509 513-514 789 P 2d 1180: Officers initial contact with vehicle permissible to determine whether occupants in need of assistance, but officer request for identification [was] not warranted, and the detention should have terminated once officer determined no care taking was needed.
Commonwealth v Haskell 438 Mass 790. Supreme Court: When defendant was asked whether he had a license for the handgun, without first having been advised of his Miranda rights, the police conducted a custodial interrogation, in violation of the fifth amendment. The form of the police question was such that it was a request for testimonial communication, and defendants answer… was properly suppressed… Because it is legal in Massachusetts to cary a gun… a report that an individual possesses a gun, without any additional information suggesting criminal activity, does not create a reasonable suspicion that a crime is or will be committed. See Commonwealth v Couture, 407 Mass 178 183 552 N.E. 2d 538… Miranda warnings are required whenever police investigation occurs in a custodial setting…. Firearm, ammunition, and statements should have been suppressed, as defendant did not manifest behavior that indicated he was engaged in criminal activity or was… dangerous… the [Miranda] warnings may not be waived by statute.
Commonwealth v Silva 366 Mass 402: The Standard for justifying a stop is a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.
United States v Lee 631 F Supp 2nd 915: There are Three Categories of interaction between police and citizens: Consensual encounters, temporary detentions (or Terry stops) and arrests. The fourth amendment applies to the latter two. Thus, a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion to conduct a temporary detention or probable cause to conclude an arrest.
Commonwealth v Lindsy 72 Mass App Ct 485, 492, 893 N.E. 2d 52: [The emergency exception to Miranda], This exception applies to a narrow class of circumstances; "[tine injury sought to be avoided must be immediate and serious, and the mere existence of a potentially harmful circumstance is not sufficient." Commonwealth v. Kirschner, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 841-842 (2006).
Commonwealth v Sondrini 48 Mass App Ct 704, 707, 724 N.E. 2d 748: (In which a warrantless police intrusion may have been justified because of the community care-taking function. But lost justification once the police transformed it into the investigation of criminal activity.)
State v DeArman 54 Wash 621, 625 744 P 2d 1247: Once it became clear to officer that the motorists car was not disabled and did not need assistance, officer had no reason to proceed with stop.
State v Markgraf 59 Wash App 509 513-514 789 P 2d 1180: Officers initial contact with vehicle permissible to determine whether occupants in need of assistance, but officer request for identification [was] not warranted, and the detention should have terminated once officer determined no care taking was needed.
Commonwealth v Haskell 438 Mass 790. Supreme Court: When defendant was asked whether he had a license for the handgun, without first having been advised of his Miranda rights, the police conducted a custodial interrogation, in violation of the fifth amendment. The form of the police question was such that it was a request for testimonial communication, and defendants answer… was properly suppressed… Because it is legal in Massachusetts to cary a gun… a report that an individual possesses a gun, without any additional information suggesting criminal activity, does not create a reasonable suspicion that a crime is or will be committed. See Commonwealth v Couture, 407 Mass 178 183 552 N.E. 2d 538… Miranda warnings are required whenever police investigation occurs in a custodial setting…. Firearm, ammunition, and statements should have been suppressed, as defendant did not manifest behavior that indicated he was engaged in criminal activity or was… dangerous… the [Miranda] warnings may not be waived by statute.
Commonwealth v Silva 366 Mass 402: The Standard for justifying a stop is a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.
United States v Lee 631 F Supp 2nd 915: There are Three Categories of interaction between police and citizens: Consensual encounters, temporary detentions (or Terry stops) and arrests. The fourth amendment applies to the latter two. Thus, a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion to conduct a temporary detention or probable cause to conclude an arrest.